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 Abstract 
Empire-building by managers implies that they use a lower effective discount rate in making 
investment decisions.  We use actual investment decisions to measure the gap between the 
manager’s effective discount rate and the market rate.  Our empirical work is based on panel 
data for 193 Canadian firms.  Distinctive institutional features, such as interrelated groups of 
Canadian firms and concentrated share ownership, allow us to quantify the sensitivity of 
effective discount rates and governance problems to these institutional control mechanisms.  
For the firms most likely to be affected by the agency problems highlighted by Jensen 
(1986), estimated discount rates are 350-400 basis points less than the market rate, 
supporting the Free Cash Flow view that unresolved corporate governance problems distort 
firm behavior.  Firms in our sample that face Free Cash Flow problems have a stock of fixed 
capital approximately 7% to 22% higher than would prevail under value maximizing behavior. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper proposes a "revealed preference" approach for examining corporate governance 
problems in terms of discount rates.  As established by many theories, governance problems 
have a direct and immediate impact on the effective discount rate guiding investment 
decisions made by executives.  Our approach uses actual investment spending on business 
plant and equipment, and uncovers the discount rates guiding investment behavior.  By 
comparing the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we generate new 
evidence quantifying the extent to which governance problems distort firm behavior. 
Our analysis distinguishes between discount rates used by shareholders and those used by 
corporate executives.  Shareholders’ discount rates have been studied by many researchers 
usually in terms of the relations among stock prices, dividends, and earnings.
1  As noted by 
Stein (1996) and Dow and Gorton (1997), biases in shareholders’ discount rates have no 
necessary implications for those used by corporate executives.  The latter discount rates are 
critical for determining investment spending, and hence are key to understanding 
governance issues and possible distortions of firm behavior.  
This study generates evidence bearing on governance problems by examining actual 
patterns of investment spending to reveal the effective discount rate used by executives.  
Governance problems arise from divergent incentives and asymmetric information between 
owners and executives.  These conflicts, coupled with the impossibility of writing contracts 
covering all future contingencies, lead to unresolved governance problems affecting firm 
behavior (Hart, 1995).  The Free Cash Flow model of Jensen (1986) emphasizes that 
executives have interests that differ from those of owners and pursue projects that, when 
evaluated at the market discount rate used by shareholders, have negative net present value 
(NPV).  Such a departure from value maximization can be interpreted in terms of an effective 
discount rate that is low relative to the shareholders’ discount rate.  While acknowledging the 
potential difficulties caused by agency conflicts, an alternative set of theories holds that 
pressures operating through the capital, product, and factor markets are sufficiently strong to 
largely overcome these problems.
2  From the perspective of this Perfect Markets model, 
financial markets allocate resources efficiently and investment decisions and discount rates 
remain unbiased by potential governance problems.  In this paper, we compare executives’ 
and shareholders’ discount rates in order to shed light on these theories of corporate 
governance. 
                                                       
1
 For example, see Daniels and Morck (1995) for Canada, Hall and Hall (1993) for the United States, and 
references cited therein. 
2 See Alchian (1950), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Miller (1997).  Relying on legal protections (possibly 
determined as the outcome of competition among states) to defend the interests of owners, Carney (1997), 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), and Romano (1993) reach a similar conclusion about the corporate governance 
system in the United States. 2 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
The econometric equation that is the basis for our empirical work is developed in the next 
two sections.  Section 2 begins with the net present value rule used in capital budgeting and, 
after suitable transformation, develops an estimating equation that links investment 
spending, discount rates, and governance problems.  This estimating equation is equivalent 
to the Euler investment equation.  Section 3 discusses specification issues, and shows how 
information from the transformed net present value rule and variation in firm-level panel data 
can “reveal” the effective discount rate guiding investment decisions.   With adjustments for 
risk and depreciation, we estimate the gap between the discount rates used by executives 
and shareholders by sorting firms into mutually exclusive and exhaustive contrasting classes 
based on firm characteristics identified in the literature as indicating governance problems 
(e.g., firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities). 
Section 4 discusses the sources and construction of the variables in our panel dataset 
containing 193 Canadian firms.  Canada is a useful “laboratory” in which to study corporate 
governance in light of the recent challenge to the Berle-Means perspective advanced by La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999).  They argue that the Berle-Means firm with 
widely-dispersed ownership is the exception rather than the rule for industrialized and 
industrializing economies.  The notable exceptions are the United Kingdom and the United 
States where 90% and 80%, respectively, of the largest firms are widely held.  These 
prototypical Berle-Means economies contrast with a comparable sample average of 24%.
3  
However, the Canadian economy occupies an exceedingly useful middle ground with 50% of 
large firms being widely held.  Consequently, there is a notable amount of institutional 
variation with which to study corporate governance issues.  The existence of concentrated 
share ownership in Canada and interrelated groups of Canadian firms allow us to assess the 
sensitivity of the executives’ discount rates to these distinctive institutional structures.   
Empirical results are contained in the next two sections.  In Section 5, we reject the Perfect 
Markets model, but find strong support for the Free Cash Flow model.  “Jensen firms” – 
those firms most likely to suffer from the agency costs of free cash flow discussed by Jensen 
(1986) – have risk-adjusted discount rates 350-400 basis points lower than the discount 
rates used by shareholders.  With the economic and statistical significance of Free Cash 
Flow problems established, Section 6 assesses the ability of various mechanisms to 
attenuate these problems.  We document that concentrated ownership is associated with 
higher (less distorted) discount rates for Jensen firms.    
Section 7 applies our procedure for estimating effective discount rates to capital structure 
issues.  In a recent survey of the literature, Myers (2001) emphasizes that a unified theory of 
capital structure applicable to all firms has not emerged, and lists the Free Cash Flow and 
Pecking Order models as two of the leading theories.  Does our evidence favoring the Free 
                                                       
3 The ownership figures are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, Table II.B). I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 3 
Cash Flow model, preclude the empirical importance of the financing problems highlighted 
by the Pecking Order model?   We measure the distortions associated with these models in 
terms of discount rates estimated from a common framework, and find that, for some firms at 
some times, Free Cash Flow problems are important, while at other times, perhaps for the 
same firm, Pecking Order problems are important.  
Section 8 presents a summary and conclusions.  By comparing executives’ and 
shareholders’ discount rates, we document that governance problems of the sort 
emphasized by Jensen’s Free Cash Flow model are substantial and reduced by the close 
monitoring afforded by concentrated ownership.  The capital stock of Jensen firms identified 
in this study is approximately 7% to 22% too large because of governance problems.      
2.  The Net Present Value Rule And The Euler Investment Equation  
The general principle guiding our estimation strategy is to infer discount rates used by 
corporate executives from the patterns of their actual investment spending.  The estimating 
equation is based on the net present value (NPV) rule used in capital budgeting that links 
investment spending, discount rates, and corporate governance problems.  This section 
shows how a simple transformation of the NPV rule generates the Euler equation usually 
derived from the standard intertemporal model of real investment spending found in the 
economics literature.  
We begin with the fundamental capital budgeting decision rule that identifies positive NPV 
projects by comparing the marginal costs and benefits from acquiring an additional unit of 
capital,  
                          ∞
  MIC
          
t   <    Σ  ICFt+j  R
j , (1) 
   
                j=0   
         R  ≡  1 / (1+r),  (2) 
where MICt is the sum of the purchase price of a new unit of capital relative to the price of 
output and the marginal adjustment cost at time t, the ICFt+j’s are the incremental cash flows 
per unit of capital associated with the project that will accrue in current and future periods, 
and R is the real discount factor defined in terms of the real risk-adjusted discount rate, r.
4  
The firm should continue to acquire capital until (1) is satisfied with equality.  
                                                       
4 For expositional convenience, the derivations in this section are based on the assumptions of a constant discount 
rate and non-depreciating capital.  These assumptions can be relaxed if the estimating equation is derived from a 4 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
To derive the Euler investment equation from the NPV rule, we begin by assuming that the 
marginal investment equates benefits and costs, and hence (1) can be analyzed as an 
equality for period t as follows, 
                 ∞           ∞ 
  MICt   =   Σ  ICFt+j  R
j   =   ICFt +  Σ  ICFt+j  R
j. (3) 
   
              j=0                               j=1 
Consider the NPV rule in period t+1 and, to facilitate eventual cancellation, multiply both 
sides by R and redefine the j index appropriately,  
                             ∞                         ∞ 
  R * MICt+1   =   R  Σ  ICFt+1+j  R
j   =    Σ  ICFt+j  R
j. (4) 
   
  
                                                                                                                                                     
                          j=0        
                   j=1        
All future ICF’s can be eliminated by subtracting (4) from (3) and rearranging, 
  ICFt  -  (MICt  -  R * MICt+1) =  0.  (5) 
Equation (5) is the Euler investment equation describing optimal investment behavior and 
the intertemporal tradeoff between costs and benefits of acquiring an additional unit of 
capital.  To obtain an intuitive understanding of the Euler equation, assume that the firm is 
currently on the path of optimal capital accumulation.  Along this path, the firm will be 
indifferent to an increase in capital by 1 unit in period t and a decrease of 1 unit in t+1, thus 
leaving the capital stock unaffected from period t+1 onward.  The benefit of this hypothetical 
change is represented by ICFt.  Changing the capital stock is costly, and the Euler 
investment equation sets ICFt equal to the marginal investment cost incurred in t minus the 
marginal investment cost saved in t+1 (this saving arises because the firm does not now 
need to acquire an additional unit of capital to remain on its optimal accumulation path).  The 
t+1 saving is placed on a present value basis by the firm’s one-period discount factor, R.   
 
dynamic optimization problem with variational methods.  See Chirinko (1993) for a formal analysis of the Euler 
equation.  Risk-adjustment is discussed in Section 4.2 and Appendix B. I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 5 
3.  The Econometric Equation And Estimation 
Strategy 
3.1. Variables In The Econometric Equation 
The econometric equation used in estimation is based on the transformed NPV rule.  In 
order to estimate (5), we need to specify MICi,t, ICFi,t, and Ri,t, where the i subscript indexes 
firms.  MICi,t is the sum of purchase costs (p
I
i,t, discussed in Section 4.1.) and marginal 
adjustment costs.  We assume (as is standard in the literature) that marginal adjustment 
costs depend on the investment/capital ratio (INVTi,t), and are defined by a second-order 
Taylor expansion, 
  MICi,t   =   p
I
i,t  +  (α0  +  α1INVTi,t  +  α2INVTi,t
2). (6) 
All variables are adjusted for taxes.
5 
With respect to the ICFi,t, assume for the moment that the firm's production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale, product markets are perfectly competitive, and adjustment costs 
are absent.  In this special case, the marginal product of capital equals the average product 
of capital, where the latter is defined as total revenues less total variable costs, all divided by 
the capital stock.  We adopt less restrictive assumptions by allowing the production function 
to be homogeneous of degree ξ (where ξ is not necessarily equal to unity, the value defining 
constant returns to scale) and the product markets to be imperfectly competitive.  Rewriting 
the revenue function (which reflects both production and adjustment costs), using Euler's 
Theorem on Homogeneous Functions, and rearranging terms to isolate the marginal product 
of capital, we obtain the following specification, 
  ICFi,t   =   ψ*REVi,t  -  COSTi,t  -  (α0  +  α1INVTi,t  +  α2INVTi,t
2)*INVTi,t,    (7) 
where REVi,t and COSTi,t are revenue and variable costs, respectively, divided by the capital 
stock, and ψ is a parameter capturing the combined effects of non-constant returns to scale 
and imperfect competition.  Increasing returns to scale implies that ψ > 1.  Under decreasing 
returns to scale or non-competitive product markets, ψ < 1.  In the special case described 
above, ψ equals one, marginal adjustment costs are zero (the α's = 0), and (7) equates 
marginal and average products of capital. 
Lastly, an error term (ei,.t) is added to the Euler equation.
6  These considerations lead to the 
following estimating equation that is the basis for the empirical results, 
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  ICFi,t  -  (MICi,t  -  Ri,t * MICi,t+1)   =   ei,t ,  (8) 
where Ri,t is the discount factor to be discussed in the next sub-section. 
3.2. The Discount Factor And The Estimation Strategy   
The discount factor contains three components:  the shareholders’ discount rate (r
S
i,t, equal 
to the risk-adjusted real market interest rate), a firm-specific geometric depreciation rate (δi),
7 
and the gap (possibly equal to zero) between the discount rates used by executives (r
E
i,t) and 
shareholders.  To further motivate our revealed preference approach with its focus on 
discount rates, Appendix A contains a parsimonious model showing how utility-maximizing 
behavior by managers with a preference for empire-building implies that the discount rate 
used by executives will be less than that used by shareholders.  This gap is represented by a 
parameter, φ. 
The quantitative impact of governance problems on firm behavior is assessed by comparing 
the investment behavior of contrasting classes of firms and using that information to infer the 
discount rates being used by executives.  Classes are defined by characteristics identified 
previously in the literature as indicating governance problems.  For example, the governance 
problems emphasized by Jensen may occur for firms with high free cash flow and poor 
investment opportunities.  Since some of these characteristics may change for a given firm 
over time, we evaluate the sorting criteria and form our contrasting classes for each firm/year 
observation.  In computing the estimates, we recognize the possibility that factors other than 
governance problems may affect discount rates, and capture the impact of these factors by 
including an additional term in the discount rate, ζ, common to all firms in the sample.  With 
the sorted samples, distortions due to governance problems are measured by the parameter 
φ, which is estimated only for the class associated with a particular governance problem.  
These considerations lead to the following formulation of the discount factor,  
  Ri,t   ≡   (1-δi)  /  ((1+r
S
i,t) (1 + ζ + Γi,t*φ)) .  (9a) 




i,t) .  (9b) 
where Γi,t is an indicator variable – 1 if a firm falls into a particular class (e.g., high free cash 
flow and poor investment opportunities), 0 otherwise.  Conditional on systematic risk and 
depreciation (which differ among firms) and the common factor affecting all firms, our 
                                                                                                                                                      
6 If the Euler equation is derived from a formal dynamic optimization problem, this stochastic error term is linked 
directly to expectation errors and technology shocks. I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 7 
measure of corporate governance problems is φ, the gap between the executives’ and 
shareholders’ discount rates. 
Lastly, regarding estimation, the Euler equation contains contemporaneous and future 
variables that may be correlated with the error term.  An additional correlation might arise 
because of measurement or specification error.  Consequently, an instrumental variables 
estimation technique is required.  We use the Generalized Method of Moments technique 
(GMM) because it delivers consistent parameter estimates and allows for a general pattern 
of conditional heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
8 
4.  The Canadian Dataset 
4.1.  Financial Statement Data 
Our empirical work is based on a balanced panel of 193 Canadian firms for the period 1973 
to 1986.  Various computations and the presence of variables dated t+1 in the estimating 
equation reduce the period used in estimation to 1975 to 1985.  The basic sources are the 
CANSIM, Laval, and Financial Post databases.  The latter two are comparable to the often 
used CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases, respectively, for U.S. firms. 
The estimating equation (8) requires data for investment, revenues, costs, and the physical 
capital stock.  Three series are drawn directly from the Financial Post Annual Corporate 
Database.  Investment (INVTi,t) is gross capital expenditures on property, plant and 
equipment.  Revenue (REVi,t) is net sales.  Cost (COSTi,t) is revenue minus operating 
income, where operating income is the income derived from the principal activities of a 
business after deducting all operating expenses except depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, interest expense and miscellaneous expenses included in the other 
income/expense category.  All three series are divided by the current dollar replacement cost 
of the fixed capital stock (K$i,t).  
                                                                                                                                                      
7 With depreciating capital, the saving in marginal investment costs in period  t+1  is lowered to only  (1-δ)  units of 
surviving capital.   









i,t-1, time (t), time squared (t
2), and  Γi,t  (cf. (10)).  All variables are 
adjusted for taxes as discussed in Section 4.1.  The instruments are primarily lagged values of the terms in the Euler 
equation (8) and the auxiliary relations ((6), (7), and (9)).  Such instruments are chosen because they are valid 
(uncorrelated with the error term) and relevant (correlated with the variables appearing in the regression).  We also 
use a constant time, and time squared, which are attractive instruments because they are unequivocally exogenous.  
It proved difficult to estimate α0; instead, we undertake a grid search, choosing the value α0 that minimizes the GMM 
criterion. 8 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
This capital stock is constructed for a given firm in two steps.  The first step estimates the 
depreciation rate (δi).  We calculate firm-specific depreciation rates based on the firm's 
reported depreciation.  The details are based on the procedure used by Salinger and 





t-1) * (1-δi), where Ii,t is current dollar gross capital expenditures and p'
I
t is 
the implicit price index for business investment in machinery and equipment (CANSIM series 
D11123).   
The tax-adjusted relative price ratio, p
I





t).  The tax terms capture the sum of federal and provincial corporate 
income tax rates (τi,t, incorporating variation across time and industries), the investment tax 
credit rate (itct), and the present value of tax depreciation allowances (zt).  The output price 
(p
o
t) is the implicit price index for final domestic demand (CANSIM series 11130).  
Variables defining the contrasting classes will be discussed below.  
4.2. The Market Discount Rate  
The discount factor (Ri,t, defined in (9)) depends on, inter alia, the shareholders’ real risk-
adjusted discount rate, r
S
i,t, defined as follows: 
  r
S
i,t  =  ((1+ii,t) / (1+π
e
t)) - 1.0.  (10) 
This rate discounts annual cash flows from the middle-of-period t to the middle-of-period t+1.  
(See Appendix B for specific details concerning variable construction and data sources.)  The 
components of r
S
i,t are defined as follows.  The one year expected inflation rate is 
represented by π
e
t, which equals actual inflation.  If the firm is operating in the interests of 
shareholders, it will use the nominal discount rate defined by ii,t,   
  ii,t  =  λi(1-τi,t)i
DEBT 
t  +  (1-λi)i
EQUITY 
i,t, (11) 
where λi is the firm-specific leverage ratio, τi,t is the marginal rate (federal and provincial) of 
corporate income taxation, i
DEBT
t is the nominal, one year, Commercial Paper rate, and 
i
EQUITY
i,t is the nominal, short-term, risk-adjusted cost of equity capital, 
  i
E
i,t  =  i
F
t + σi,  (12) 
where i
F
t is the nominal, one year risk-free Treasury Bill rate, and σi is the equity risk 
premium estimated by either the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model (see 
Appendix B for details). I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 9 
4.3. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 for all 193 firms.  Column 1 is for the full sample.  
Columns 2-3 and 4-5 are sorted by characteristics defining Jensen firms that will feature 
prominently in the empirical results.  
5.  Assessing Corporate Governance Problems 
In a classic paper, Jensen (1986) argues that executives are more likely to squander 
resources on negative NPV projects when a firm has substantial free cash flow and poor 
investment opportunities.  He identified the oil industry from 1973 to the mid-1980’s as being 
particularly susceptible to these preconditions.  We therefore begin by comparing the 
investment behavior and discount rates used by firms in the oil industry to the remaining 
firms.  A firm is classified as an “oil firm” if it belongs to Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 
industry 300.
9  Our estimates suggest that the discount rate used by oil industry executives 
is about 260 basis points lower than the shareholders’ discount rate (r
S).  The gap between r
E 
and r
S is statistically significant at the 10% level.  These results are consistent with Jensen’s 
conjecture that, during our estimation period 1975-1985, oil firms suffered from unresolved 
governance problems and overinvestment in fixed capital.    
The specifications reported in row 1 of Table 2 differ only by the method of risk-adjustment, 
either the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3) in column 1 or the CAPM in column 2.  The 
gap between executives’ and shareholders’ discount rates is very similar regardless how we 
adjust for risk.  Based on FF3, oil industry executives use a discount rate 260 basis points 
lower than that used by shareholders; based on CAPM, the comparable figure is 280 basis 
points.  Thus the two methods of risk adjustment yield estimates of the gap between r
E and 
r
S that are within 20 basis points of each other.  This is a general finding throughout our 
empirical results:  the estimates of r
E - r
S based on the FF3 are always close to those based 
on the CAPM, never diverging by more than one standard error.  The following discussion 
will focus primarily on the results based on the FF3 risk adjustment.  
Table 2 also displays estimates of ψ, the parameter capturing deviations from constant 
returns to scale in production and perfect competition in the product market.   This parameter 
is estimated precisely, and its value is always less than unity.  A value of ψ less than unity is 
consistent with decreasing returns to scale regardless of the competitive nature of output 
markets or increasing returns and a sufficient degree of imperfect competition to force the 
marginal return to capital below its average return.  In either case, it implies that the firms are 
earning positive economic rents.  As shown in the model in Appendix A, such rents are 
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important because governance problems can exist in equilibrium only if the firm earns 
positive economic profits that allow it to “indulge” in sub-optimal investment. 
A second way of identifying Jensen-type governance problems is to focus on those firms with 
high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities.  Free cash flow (FCF1) is defined as 
cash flow (revenues less cash expenses including tax and interest payments) less dividends, 
all for the previous year, divided by the replacement value of fixed capital.  Investment 
opportunities are measured by the Brainard-Tobin Q.
10  With these definitions, contrasting 
classes are formed in a three-step process.  First, we find the firm/year observations for 
which FCF1 is in the top 2/3 of their TSE industry in a given year.  Second, we find the 
firm/year observations for which Q is in the bottom 2/3 of their TSE industry in a given year.  
Third, we form the intersection of these two sets (which contains approximately one-half of 
the sample) to identify Jensen firms.  As shown in row 2 of Table 2 for the FF3 risk 
adjustment, our estimate suggests that the executives of firms with high free cash flow and 
poor investment opportunities use a discount rate 350 basis points lower than the discount 
rate of shareholders.  This gap  between r
E and r
S is statistically significant. 
As a check of the robustness of our results, we also consider a second measure defined by 
free cash flow in the previous two years (FCF2).  The results displayed in row 3 of Table 2 
indicate that the gap between r
E and r
S remains economically and statistically significant.     
The above sortings are based on preconditions for the emergence of governance problems 
associated with free cash flow.  An additional test can be constructed based on a symptom of 
governance problems.  Firms that have poor investment opportunities but nonetheless 
continue to investment substantial sums in fixed capital are likely to be suffering from 
unresolved governance problems.  We thus create contrasting classes by sorting firm/year 
observations for which Q is in the bottom 2/3 of their industry in a given year, constructing a 
separate sorting for firm/year observations for which investment spending (relative to the 
replacement value of the capital stock) is in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year, and 
then forming the intersection of these two sets.  For these Jensen firms, executives use a 
discount rate that is 340 basis points lower than that used by shareholders (row 4 of 
Table 2).   
                                                       
10  Q is defined for the beginning of the period as follows, Q ≡ [(E + D - TDB) - K$(1-δ)T] /  
[K$(1-δ)(1-τ)], where E is the market value of the firm's equity at the beginning of period t, D is the market value of 
existing short-term and long-term debt, TDB is the tax depreciation bond representing the present value of all tax 
depreciation allowances claimed in the current period on existing capital (Hayashi, 1982), 
 K$ is the current dollar 
replacement cost of fixed capital, δ is the rate of economic depreciation, T equals (1-itc-τ∗z) representing 
adjustments for the investment tax credit (itc) and tax depreciation (τ∗z) per Section 4.1, and τ is the corporate 
income tax rate reflecting federal and provincial tax rates.  The TDB series (as well as the present value of 
depreciation allowances on a unit of new capital) is calculated using the method suggested by Salinger and 
Summers (1983). I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 11 
The results presented in Table 2 have two implications for governance problems.  First, the 
economically and statistically significant gap between r
E and r
S that emerges from a variety 
of sortings strongly indicate the importance of governance problems highlighted by the Free 
Cash Flow model.  Based on the average of the eight estimated gaps between r
E and r
S, the 
discount rate guiding investment decisions for Jensen firms is 325 basis points lower than 
that used by shareholders.
11  All of the estimates in Table 2 are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Second, the Perfect Markets model holds that markets are largely able 
to overcome corporate governance problems and hence that there will not be any systematic 
gaps between r
E and r
S based on the different classifications considered here.  This key 
implication is decisively rejected in Table 2. 
6.  Curing Free Cash Flow Problems? 
The results in Section 5 indicate that governance problems associated with the Free Cash 
Flow model loom large for several classes of firms.  Quantifying governance problems in 
terms of discount rates presents an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of various 
corporate control mechanisms in reducing the agency costs of free cash flow.  In his initial 
article on free cash flow, Jensen (1986) emphasized that leverage is a key financial control 
mechanism and thus that the increased debt loads borne by major American companies 
were beneficial as a corporate control device disciplining executives.  While not discounting 
the benefits of leverage, Jensen’s (1993) Presidential Address to the American Finance 
Association highlighted the role of strong institutions in curbing managerial abuses.  These 
institutional control mechanisms can be assessed with our data because of the presence of 
interrelated groups and concentrated ownership for many Canadian firms. 
This section focuses exclusively on those firms suffering from Free Cash Flow problems, and 
quantifies the extent to which these problems are attenuated by various control mechanisms.  
We construct the sample used in this section from the full sample of 193 firms by identifying 
those firm/year observations with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities.   
These are the same firm/year observations discussed in Section 5 for which the estimates 
presented in row 2 of Table 2 show that executives use a lower discount rate than 
shareholders.  In this section, we simply refer to these firm/year observations as “Jensen 
firms.”  Our estimation strategy determines whether this discount rate gap (r
E - r
S) for one 
                                                       
11 The conclusion that effective discount rates are low relative to market rates seems to stand in contrast to previous 
studies that have quantified discount rates by surveying corporate executives (e.g., Blume, Friend, and Westerfield 
(1980, especially Tables 17 and 18) and Poterba and Summers (1995)).  The latter authors received completed 
questionnaires from 228 U.S. firms and, among other findings, report that hurdle rates are “distinctly higher than 
equity holders’ average rates of return and much higher than the return on debt during the past half-century” (p. 43).  
Apart from any differences in methodology (survey responses vs. actual spending patterns), these numbers are not 
comparable to our results because they apply to all firms, while our estimating strategy focuses specifically on 
subsets of firms most likely to be affected by a particular governance problem.   12 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
class of Jensen firms differs systematically from that for a contrasting class of Jensen firms 
influenced by a particular control mechanism.  We refer to this “difference-in-the-gaps” as χ.  
Contrasting classes of firms are formed by three control characteristics – debt, group 
membership, and concentrated ownership. 
Many authors have emphasized that increased debt loads could serve as a useful control 
device.
12  In principle, debt finance could curb the temptation to squander resources in 
several ways:  by withdrawing cash from the hands of misbehaving executives, by increasing 
the danger that executives might lose control of the firm in a period of financial distress, or by 
forcing firms into external capital markets where effective monitoring is undertaken by 
knowledgeable outsiders.  To examine the effectiveness of debt as a control mechanism, we 
classify firm/year observations as high-debt firms if their short-term and long-term debt 
normalized by the replacement value of fixed capital (DEBT) is greater than the median for 
their industry in a given year.  If debt is an effective control mechanism, then, among Jensen 
firms, higher debt should be associated with higher discount rates.  In this case, the gap 
between executives’ and shareholders’ discount rates should be reduced.  Since χ equals  
[(r
E
High Debt Jensen - r
S
High Debt Jensen) - (r
E
Low Debt Jensen - r
S
Low Debt Jensen)] and the gaps  
(r
E - r
S) are negative, χ will be positive if debt is an effective control mechanism.  However, as 
shown in row 1 of Table 3, the χ’s are very close to zero, and there is no evidence 
suggesting that debt reduces governance problems. 
The second control mechanism we examine is based on an institutional characteristic of the 
Canadian economy.  Unlike the United States, Canada has several major Canadian 
industrial groups involving ownership or other connections among many distinct enterprises 
with their own publicly traded shares.  (Several countries have similar interrelated firms; see 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) for further discussion.)  A firm is classified 
as having “group membership” if it is related to a Canadian conglomerate that brings 
together many distinct enterprises with their own publicly-traded shares.
13  E a c h  f i r m  i s  
effectively controlled by the group, typically through equity ownership.  Many of the groups 
are associated with a particular family or individual (e.g., Black, Bronfman, Reichman), but 
not all (e.g., Bell Canada, Canadian Pacific).  
Group membership has uncertain effects as a governance mechanism.  For firms in an 
interrelated group, long-term relations and frequent dealings – between the lead firm and 
affiliates and among affiliates – arguably create incentives for effective monitoring.  However, 
                                                       
12 Among other studies analyzing debt and control, see Grossman and Hart (1982), Harris and Raviv (1990), and 
Aghion and Bolton (1992).  
13 Data on group membership, as well as concentrated ownership discussed below, are obtained from Statistics 
Canada’s Intercorporate Ownership 1984. I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 13 
recent work casts doubts on this sanguine conclusion.  The theoretical analysis of Bebchuk, 
Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) highlights weaknesses with a cross-ownership structure as a 
control mechanism.  Relative to executives in a dispersed ownership firm, the controllers of a 
firm with a cross-ownership structure are entrenched; relative to an owner with a very large 
equity stake, cash flow rights (and hence the incentive to create value) are low.   
Consequently, governance problems for group firms may be greater than for other firms. 
Among firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities, there is some 
evidence that group membership is associated with better performance.   In row 2 of Table 3, 
the gap between executives’ and shareholders’ discount rates is about 200 basis points 
narrower for Jensen firms that are group members than for Jensen firms that are 
independent.  However, as measured by χ, the difference is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels, a result that may be partly due to the somewhat small sub-sample of 
Jensen firms belonging to a group with which the estimates are computed. 
Concentrated shareownership is the third control mechanism we examine.  In Canada, 
unlike the United States, a substantial proportion of the firms traded on the main stock 
exchange are majority-owned or controlled by a single shareholder.  For a sample of firms 
with sales in excess of 2 billion US dollars, Rao and Lee-Sing (1995, p. 89) report that 58% 
of Canadian companies are concentrated (per the above definition), while the proportion 
drops to 9% in the United States.  Similar proportions are reported by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999, Table II.B).  Nearly half of the firms in our full sample have 
concentrated ownership defined as either one shareholder having 50% or more of the shares 
or as the firm being effectively controlled by another firm.  (For example, Brascan was 
effectively controlled by the Bronfman family, although they only owned 43% of the shares.) 
The role of concentrated ownership in resolving corporate governance problems is also 
ambiguous.  By internalizing the costs of exercising control, concentrated ownership 
eliminates free-rider problems, and thus provides controlling owners with the incentive to 
expend resources to monitor and discipline management.  For Jensen firms, this additional 
monitoring would tend to reduce the gap between executives’ and shareholders’ discount 
rates, and thus would be reflected in a positive χ.  However, for substantial levels of 
concentration, firm resources may be directed for the owner's private benefit, as suggested 
by the premium paid on large blockholdings (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).  The adverse 
effects of concentration may be particularly acute in Canada because many large ownership 
stakes are inherited.  Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000) document the detrimental 
effects of this particular type of ownership (dubbed the "Canadian Disease") on firm 
performance.  In this case, we would expect χ to be negative. 
The empirical results presented in row 3 of Table 3 indicate that concentrated 
shareownership is associated with fewer governance problems.  The gap between 
executives’ and shareholders’ discount rates shrinks by more than 300 basis points for 14 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
Jensen firms with concentrated ownership (relative to Jensen firms with dispersed 
ownership), effectively eliminating the gap.  These estimated χ’s are statistically significant at 
the 5% level.   
7.  Capital Structure And Discount Rates 
In a recent survey of the literature, Myers (2001) lists the Free Cash Flow and Pecking Order 
models as two of the leading theories of capital structure.  Does the evidence presented so 
far, which favors the Free Cash Flow model, preclude the empirical importance of the 
financing problems highlighted by the Pecking Order model?  Not necessarily, since some 
firms may be constrained by a Pecking Order while others face Free Cash Flow problems.
14  
Even for a given firm, these problems may vary over time.  For example, with unexpected 
variation in product demand, a firm may have insufficient inside funds to finance its positive 
net present value projects, and face relatively higher costs when securing outside finance.  
At another point in time, the same firm may find itself with modest investment opportunities, 
surplus cash flow, and a substantial temptation to squander resources.  Such time-varying 
changes in circumstances are at the core of Stulz’s model of capital structure in which the 
relative costs of governance and finance problems determine the optimal mix of debt and 
equity (Stulz, 1990).  Measuring these costs in terms of discount rates estimated from a 
common framework generates insights into this theory of optimal financial policy and, more 
generally, the factors affecting capital structure.
15 
Higher costs of outside finance arise when suppliers of external finance cannot assess the 
quality of firms and their investment projects (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
16  Given an inability 
to discriminate between high and low quality firms, shareholders add a "lemons premium" to 
the cost of outside finance.  Adverse selection occurs because high quality firms tend to 
avoid external capital markets, reducing the quality of the pool of borrowers and creating a 
sustainable positive difference between the costs of inside and outside funds.  This 
difference creates a financial hierarchy or Pecking Order (in which firms exhaust inside funds 
before using relatively expensive outside funds), and depends on the limitations firm face in 
accessing external capital markets.   
                                                       
14 Myers (2001, p. 81), specifically argues that "The free cash flow theory is designed for mature firms that are 
prone to overinvest." 
15 The close relation between governance and finance problems has been noted in the survey of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p. 773): "Corporate governance deals with the agency problem: the separation of management and 
finance." 
16 See Hubbard (1998) for a recent survey and the work of Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Whited (1992), and Ng 
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This section focuses on those firms most likely to both need outside finance and face a 
relatively higher cost for outside funds (thereby using a higher effective discount rate) as 
predicted by the Pecking Order model.  Our strategy for assessing financing problems is 
similar to that for governance problems:  we identify a subset of firms likely to face finance 
constraints and, based on their pattern of investment spending, estimate the difference in 
discount rates between outside and inside finance.  We use two characteristics to define 
contrasting classes of firm/year observations.  Firms with good investment opportunities are 
more likely to exhaust internal sources of finance and rely more heavily on external sources 
where financing problems may arise.  We identify these firms by sorting the firm/year 
observations for which Q is in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year.  The second 
characteristic is based on the higher financing costs faced by firms with limited access to 
external capital markets.  Limited access is measured in three ways:  by the absence of a 
bond rating (measured by an indicator variable taking the value of one if the firm does not 
have a bond rating, zero elsewise; data are obtained from the Canadian Bond Ratings 
Service and Dominion Bond Ratings Service),
17 by the two-thirds of firm/year observations 
with the highest values of DEBT (short-term and long-term debt normalized by the 
replacement value of fixed capital) in their industry in a given year, or by the two-thirds of the 
smallest firms (measured by SIZE defined in terms of the replacement value of the fixed 
capital stock).  Firms that are more likely to require high-cost outside finance are defined by 
the intersection of firm/year observations with good investment opportunities and limited 
access to external credit markets, the latter measured by one of the three preceding 
characteristics.  In each case, we contrast these firms with the remaining firms in the sample. 
Table 4 contains the results for sortings by finance problems.  In all three cases, the results 
clearly indicate the presence of economically important financing problems.  All estimates of 
differences (labeled ρ) between the cost of outside and inside funds are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  The difference between the discount rates for outside and inside 
funds is estimated at 900 basis points when we focus on the lack of a bond rating as a 
measure of the difficulty of accessing outside funds, 760 basis points when we focus on high 
levels of debt, and 910 basis points when we focus on smaller firms.  As with Free Cash 
Flow governance problems, we find strong evidence that financing problems are 
economically and statistically significant.  These results suggests that, consistent with the 
model of Stulz (1990), capital structure choices are determined by a mixture of governance 
and finance problems whose applicability varies by firm and, for a given firm, across time. 
                                                       
17 If high quality Canadian firms prefer to obtain funds from the larger US market, these firms might obtain bond 
ratings only from US rating agencies.  In this case, our procedure, which is based on ratings by Canadian rating 
agencies, will misclassify these high quality firms with ready access to external capital markets.  There are no firms 
in our sample that are not rated by a Canadian rating agency but are rated by S&P or Moody’s.  Thus, there does 
not appear to be a flight of high quality borrowers to the larger US market and its rating agencies. 16 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
8.  Summary And Conclusions 
This paper sheds new light on long-standing corporate governance issues.  We use 
information from a transformed NPV rule and variation from firm-level panel data to uncover 
effective discount rates.  In this revealed preference approach, effective discount rates 
guiding investment decisions are inferred from the pattern of investment spending.  The gap 
between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders is our measure of 
governance problems.  The empirical work is based on panel data for 193 Canadian firms.  
Distinctive institutional features, such as interrelated groups of Canadian firms and 
concentrated share ownership, allow us to quantify the sensitivity of discount rate gaps and 
governance problems to these institutional control mechanisms.  
Our key finding is that the governance problems highlighted in Jensen’s Free Cash Flow 
model prove to be economically and statistically significant.  Among other results, executives 
of firms with high levels of free cash flow and poor investment opportunities use effective 
discount rates that are 350-400 basis points below share-holders’ discount rates.  Moreover, 
the key implication of the Perfect Markets model – that there should not be any systematic 
bias in discount rates – is decisively rejected. 
With this documentation of the problems associated with the Free Cash Flow model, we then 
investigate possible cures for Jensen firms – those with high free cash flow and poor 
investment opportunities.  In our data, neither debt nor membership in an interrelated group 
of firms has any statistically significant effect in attenuating free cash flow problems.   
However, the gap between executives’ and shareholders’ discount rates is effectively 
eliminated for Jensen firms with concentrated share ownership.  These results suggest that 
institutional arrangements can be effective in curbing corporate control problems, and are 
consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997, p. 769) conclusions concerning the prominent 
role played by large shareholders in promoting good corporate governance. 
Lastly, we use our revealed preference approach to consider two prominent capital structure 
models.  For some firms at some times, Free Cash Flow problems are important.  At other 
times, perhaps for the same firm, Pecking Order problems are important.  Thus, explanations 
of capital structure choices will have to rely on several theories depending on circumstances 
that vary across firms and, for a given firm, across time. 
Apart from evaluating hypotheses, the parameter estimates permit us to quantify the impact 
of corporate governance problems on capital accumulation.  The Jorgensonian user cost of 
capital is the relevant price variable determining capital accumulation, and depends on the I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 17 
discount rate guiding investment decisions.
18  When executives use a discount rate that is 
below that of shareholders, the Jorgensonian user cost will be distorted.  Combining the 
Jorgensonian user cost with an assumption about the price elasticity of the demand for 
capital, we can estimate the extent to which Free Cash Flow problems lead firms to hold too 
much fixed capital.  With executives using discount rates 325 basis points lower than 
shareholders (the arithmetic average of the estimates in Table 2), the user cost of capital falls 
by 29.5%.  If the price elasticities of capital range from -0.25 to -0.75, firms suffering from 
unresolved governance problems have approximately 7% to 22% too much capital.
19  
Our conclusions are that Free Cash Flow problems are quantitatively important for some 
firms at some times, and can be ameliorated by concentrated ownership.  Whether these 
results extend to other countries, other legal frameworks, and other institutional settings are 
topics for future research.  
                                                       
18 The Jorgensonian user cost of capital is defined as follows:  UC = (r+δ)*p
I, where r is the discount rate (either the 
shareholders’ (r
S) or executives’ (r
E) discount rate), δ is the depreciation rate, and p
I is the price of investment goods 
relative to the price of output, adjusted for corporate income taxes, investment tax credits, and the present value of 
tax depreciation allowances (Hall and Jorgenson, 1971).  Intuitively, this user cost is the rate for renting a capital 
good for one period.  This rental rate includes a "nonrefundable security deposit" reflecting that only a fraction of the 
rented capital good will be returned because of depreciation (δ).  Representing the value of economic depreciation 
by δ in the user cost formula is equivalent to calculating the present value of a stream of deductions for a capital 
good depreciating according to a declining-balance formula at rate δ. 
19 The percentage change in the capital stock (∆K/K) equals the percentage change in the Jorgensonian user cost of 
capital (∆UC/UC) multiplied by the price elasticity (-θ).  ∆UC/UC = (r
E-r
S)∗p
I  / (r
S+δ)*p
I  = -0.0325 / (0.032 + 0.080) = 
-0.290, where the value for r
S=r
FF3 is obtained from Table 1 and δ equal to 0.080 is an average of our estimates of 
firm-specific depreciation rates computed with firms’ reported depreciation and the procedure in Salinger and 
Summers (1983).  ∆K/K =∆UC/UC * (-θ) = –0.290 ∗ (–0.50) = 0.145 based on a value of  θ  of  0.50. 18 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
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Appendix A 
Departures From Value Maximization  
To further motivate our revealed preference approach, this Appendix examines the 
implications for discount rates of departures from value maximization by utility maximizing 
executives.  A parsimonious model links governance problems to the gap between the 
discount rates used by executives and shareholders.  The version of the Free Cash Flow 
model presented here emphasizes the utility that executives receive from empire-building.  
Consider the following model of a Jensen firm, defined as a firm where executives obtain 
utility from both shareholder value and the size of the firm.  Profit (π) equals revenues (f[K,L]) 
less labor costs (w*L) less capital rental costs ((r+δ)*K), 
  π  =  f[K,L] - w*L - (r+δ)*K, (A-1) 
where f[K,L] is a production function depending on capital (K) and labor (L), and w is the 
wage rate.  The user cost of capital equals (r+δ), where r is the real risk-adjusted cost of 
funds and δ is the rate of depreciation (see footnote 18 for further discussion of the user cost 
of capital).  (The roles of taxes and relative prices have been omitted.)  For the standard 
neoclassical firm, the user cost of capital is the appropriate discount rate.  Consistent with 
the Free Cash Flow model, executives obtain utility from profit and some other characteristic 
of the firm, such as size.  The objective function for a Jensen firm is as follows, 
  U  =  U[π,K].  (A-2) 
We specify U[.] as a Cobb-Douglas function, which provides a succinct way of representing 
the differing weights placed on profit (0<β<1) and size (0<γ<1), 
U  =  π
β*K
γ.  (A-3) 
The first-order condition for utility maximization with respect to the choice of K by a Jensen 
firm is as follows, 
  0  =  β∗π
β-1∗K
γ∗(fK[K,L]-(r+δ))  +  γ∗π
β∗K
γ-1. (A-4) 
Rearranging (A-4), we obtain the following equation for the marginal product of capital  
(MPK / fK[K,L]) that implicitly determines the optimal capital stock,  
  MPK
J  =  MPK
N + φ, (A-5a) I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 23 
  φ  =  −(γ/β)*(π/K) < 0.   (A-5b) 
where MPK
J and MPK
N are the MPK’s determined by optimizing behavior by Jensen and 
standard neoclassical firms, respectively.  The key relations in (A-5) are robust to alternative 
utility functions.  When the Cobb-Douglas specification in (A-3) is replaced by a CES (with 
substitution elasticity η) or a linear function with π and K as arguments, the φ in equation  
(A-5b) becomes −(γ/β)*(π/K)
η and −(γ/β), respectively.   
There are several interesting features to this model highlighted by (A-5).  Apart from 
adjustments for depreciation and risk, MPK
N is the discount rate required by shareholders, 
and hence φ in (A-5a) is equal to (r
E - r
S).  If the firm is operating in a perfectly competitive 
environment with constant returns to scale (π=0), then φ = 0, and we obtain the standard 
neoclassical relation equating the marginal product of capital to its user cost.  This result 
reflects that Jensen-type governance problems can exist in equilibrium only if some rents 
accrue.  The discount rate gap will also be zero if executives receive utility only from profit 
(γ=0) or if executives obtain perquisite utility only from variables not entering the value 
maximization problem, such as an honorary seat on a local arts council.  However, such a 
seat is more likely to be offered the larger the size of the firm.  For the Jensen firm, the 
standard neoclassical relation fails to hold because executives obtain perquisite utility (γ>0) 
in a non-competitive environment (π>0).  It is precisely these effects that are captured by our 
estimates of (r
E - r
S). 24 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
Appendix B 
The Real Risk-Adjusted Market Discount Rate:  
Variable Construction And Data Sources 
The discount factor (Ri,t, defined in (9)) depends on the real, risk-adjusted market discount 
rate defined in the text (10) as follows,  
  r
S
i,t  =  ((1+ii,t) / (1+π
e
t)) - 1.0.  (B1) 
This rate discounts annual cash flows from the middle-of-period t to the middle-of-period t+1.  
The equity risk premium is estimated by the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) 
models.  The components of rt are defined and constructed as follows,  
ii,t    =  Nominal, short-term, risk adjusted company cost of capital from the 
middle-of-period (MOP) t to the MOP t+1, 
  =   λi (1-τi,t) i
 DEBT





t    =  Nominal, one year, Commercial Paper rate from the MOP t to the 
MOP t+1.  This rate is constructed from monthly data for the 
Canadian 90-day Commercial Paper Rate, average of daily rates 
(CANSIM series B14017).  These monthly data are converted into 
beginning-of-period (BOP) monthly data for January, April, July, and 
October by averaging the monthly data in the preceding and current 
months.  For example, the January BOP rate is the arithmetic 
average of the monthly December and January rates.  The BOP 









The one year MOP rate is constructed from these BOP rates as 
follows, 
    =  [(1+i DEBTt,JUL) (1+i DEBTt,OCT) (1+i DEBTt+1,JAN) (1+i 
DEBTt+1,APR)].25 - 1. 
i 
EQUITY
i,t    =  Nominal, short-term, risk adjusted cost of equity capital from the 
MOP t  to the MOP  t+1.   
  =       i
F
t  +  σi. 
i
F
t      =  Nominal, one year, risk free Treasury Bill rate from the MOP t to the 
MOP t+1.  This rate is constructed from monthly data for the 
Canadian 90-day Treasury Bill Rate, average yields at weekly 
auctions (CANSIM series B14007).  These monthly data are 
converted into BOP monthly data for January, April, July, and 
October by averaging the monthly data in the preceding and current 
months.  For example, the January BOP rate is the arithmetic 
average of the monthly December and January rates.  The BOP I H S — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — 25 








t,OCT.  The one 
year MOP rate is constructed from these BOP rates as follows, 









.25 - 1. 
π
e
t    =  One year inflation rate from the MOP t  to the  MOP t+1  constructed 
from monthly All Items Consumer Price Index data (CANSIM series 
P700000).  These monthly data are converted into BOP monthly 
data for July by averaging the monthly data in June and July, and 
are represented as CPIt,JUL.  The one year MOP inflation rate is 
constructed from these BOP rates as follows: 
  =   ( C P I t+1,JUL / CPIt,JUL)  -  1.0. 
σi    =  Equity risk premium.  The methods used to estimate σi are 
discussed below. 
τi,t    =  Marginal rate of corporate income taxation (federal and provincial) 
incorporating variation across time and industries. 
λi    =  Firm specific leverage ratio calculated as the time-average of bonds / 
(bonds + equity), where bonds are at book value and equity at market 
value. 
 
Two methods are used to estimate the equity risk premium, σ. Under the CAPM,  




βi   = CAPM  β from Hatch and White (1988, Table 5-36).  These industry 
β's are assigned to firms on the basis of the Toronto Stock 
Exchange's industry classification. 
µ
EQUITY     =  Total return on equities from 1950-1986: 0.1148. The source is 
Hatch and White (1988, Table 5-15).  
µ
F    =  Total return on risk free Treasury bills from 1950-1986: 0.0584.  The 
source is Hatch and White (1988, Table 5-5).   
 
We also measure the equity risk premium using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model (FF3),  
  σi  =  βi
EMR µ
EMR  +  βi
SMB µ
SMB  +  βi
HML µ
HML, (B3) 26 — Chirinko, Schaller / A Revealed Preference Approach — I H S 
where µ is a mathematical expectation, EMR is the excess market return (value-weighted 
market return minus risk-free rate), SMB is the size risk factor, and HML is the 
book-to-market risk factor.  β
EMR, β
SMB, and β
HML are the firm-specific factor loadings on these 
three risk factors.    
The portfolios are constructed as follows: firms were included in the sample in a given year 
if: 1) book equity (common stock capital, plus deferred income taxes if available) and market 
equity for the end of the previous year were available in the Financial Post dataset; and 2) 
returns data for the current year were available from the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE)-Western dataset.  All firms in the sample in a given year were ranked on size (using 
market equity) and split into small and big (S and B) depending on whether they were above 
or below the median.  All firms in the sample in a given year were then ranked by the ratio of 
book equity to market equity with breakpoints for the bottom 30% (Low), middle 40% 
(Medium), and top 30% (High).  Six portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H) were 
constructed from the intersection of the two size and three book-to-market categories, and 
monthly value-weighted returns on the six portfolios were calculated for each calendar year.   
SMB is defined as the difference, each month, between the simple average of the returns on 
the three small firm portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the corresponding simple average of 
the returns on the three big firm portfolios.  HML is defined as the difference, each month, 
between the simple average of the returns on the two high-book-to-market portfolios and the 
corresponding simple average of the returns on the two low-book-to-market portfolios.   
The factor loadings were estimated from a regression of excess returns for firm i on the three 
risk factors at a monthly frequency.  µ
EMR, µ
SMB, and µ
HML are the annualized geometric 
means of the three risk factors over all months from 1973 to 1986 inclusive. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics  
 
The entries are the median, [mean], and (standard deviation) of the indicated variable 
calculated from 1975 to 1985 for 193 Canadian firms.  COST is variable costs (sales minus 
operating income) divided by K$, the current dollar replacement cost of the fixed capital 
stock.  DEBT is short and long term debt divided by K$.  FCF1 is free cash flow defined as 
cash flow (revenues less cash expenses including tax and interest payments) less dividends 
(all for the previous year) divided by K$.  FCF2 is an alternative definition of free cash flow 
defined as cash flow less dividends (averaged for the previous two years) all divided by K$.  
INVT is gross capital expenditures on property, plant and equipment divided by K$.  p
I is the 
tax-adjusted price of investment goods relative to the price of output.  Q is the Brainard-Tobin 
Q, the financial value of the firm less the tax depreciation bond less K$ (adjusted for taxes) 
all divided by the fixed capital stock valued in terms of the price of output (see footnote 10 for 
details).  r
CAPM and r
FF3 are the real risk-adjusted market discount rates defined in Section 4.2 
and Appendix B with the equity risk premia estimated by the CAPM and Fama-French three-
factor (FF3) models, respectively.  REV is revenues divided by K$.  SIZE equals K$ stated in 
millions of Canadian dollars.  N is the number of firm/year observations.  Column 1 is for all 
firms in the sample.  Columns 2 and 3 are sorted by whether a firm’s primary operations are 
in the oil industry, TSE Industry 300; columns 4 and 5 are sorted by whether firm/year 
observations for Free Cash Flow (FCF1) are in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year 
and firm/year observations for investment opportunities (Q) are in the bottom 2/3 of their 
industry in a given year.  For further details about data definitions and the sorting variables, 
see Sections 4 and 5, respectively.   
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Table 1 




    All Firms  Oil Industry    High Free Cash Flow  
       &  
       Poor  Investment  Opportunities 
 
      Yes    No      Yes    No  
                                                                                                                                            
     (1)     (2)     (3)       (4)     (5) 
 
COST   2.406   1.223   2.609   2.174   2.538  
   [4.195]  [2.993]  [4.382]  [3.575]  [4.656] 
 (6.096)  (5.546)  (6.158)  (4.484)  (7.026) 
 
 
DEBT   1.001  0.671   1.046   0.809   1.258 
  [1.559]       [1.228]  [1.611]  [1.074]  [1.920] 
  (1.978)          (1.888)  (1.987)  (0.971)  (2.411) 
 
 
FCF1    0.071  0.071   0.071   0.083   0.055  
 [0.069]  [0.076]  [0.068]  [0.090]  [0.054] 
 (0.063)  (0.054)  (0.064)  (0.039)  (0.073) 
 
 
FCF2   0.067  0.069   0.067   0.078     0.055 
  [0.067]  [0.072]  [0.066]  [0.083]    [0.056] 
  (0.053)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.038)    (0.060) 
 
 
INVT   0.170    0.201   0.166   0.151   0.187 
 [0.248]  [0.260]  [0.246]  [0.192]  [0.289] 
 (0.350)  (0.224)  (0.366)  (0.205)  (0.423) 
 
 
pI            0.952   0.955   0.951   0.965   0.940 
           [0.979]  [0.986]  [0.979]  [0.988]  [0.973]  
           (0.168)    (0.171)  (0.168)  (0.166)  (0.170) 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics  
(Continued) 
 
        All Firms          Oil Industry    High Free Cash Flow  
        &  
           Poor  Investment  Opportunities   
         Yes       No        Yes      No  
                                                                                                                                              
       (1)        (2)       (3)        (4)      (5) 
 
Q           -0.409    -0.128    -0.455    -0.905     0.203 
             [0.688]    [0.287]    [0.750]   [-0.897]    [1.865] 




CAPM           0.040     0.050     0.038     0.036     0.043 
             [0.040    [0.049]    [0.039]    [0.037]    [0.043] 




FF3           0.032     0.041     0.030      0.027      0.035  
             [0.035]    [0.043]    [0.033]     [0.031]     [0.037] 
             (0.039)    (0.039)    (0.039)     (0.037)    (0.040) 
 
 
REV            2.834     1.474     3.067     2.510     3.059 
             [4.733]    [3.373]    [4.945]    [3.964]    [5.304] 
             (6.577)    (5.987)    (6.640)    (4.719)    (7.625) 
 
 
SIZE         62.783      80.438    60.575    65.147    61.129 
 [323.956]    [466.056]  [301.833] [370.240]  [289.567] 
 (689.773)    (989.789)  (627.847)  (783.628)  (608.836) 
 
N      2123      286     1837      905      1218 
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Table 2   
Assessing Governance Problems  
 
GMM estimates of equation (8); discount factor defined in equation (9).  The parameters in 
columns 1 and 3 are estimated based on the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) estimate of the 
equity risk premium; columns 2 and 4 are based on the CAPM estimate of the equity risk 
premium.  Contrasting classes are defined in the rows as follows:  row 1, firms with their 
primary operations in the oil industry (TSE industry 300); row 2, firm/year observations for 
which Free Cash Flow (FCF1) is in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year intersected 
with the firm/year observations for which investment opportunities (Q) are in the bottom 2/3 
of their industry in a given year; row 3, the same procedure as used in row 2 with FCF1 
replaced by Averaged Free Cash Flow (FCF2); row 4, the same procedure as used in row 2 
with FCF1 replaced by the investment/capital ratio (INVT).  Variables are defined in Table 1; 
see Section 4 and Appendix B for more extensive definitions.  (r
E - r
S) = φ is the gap between 
the discount rates used by executives and shareholders for firms indicated by the row label.  
ψ is the parameter capturing deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition.  
A value of ψ less than unity is consistent with decreasing returns to scale regardless of the 
competitive nature of output markets or increasing returns and a sufficient degree of 
imperfect competition to force the marginal return to capital below its average return.  In 
either case, it implies that the firms are earning positive economic rents.  The instruments 
are listed in footnote 8.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2   
Assessing Governance Problems  
(Continued) 
 
Contrasting Classes             Estimated Parameters 
    Gap Between   Measure Of  
    Executives’ And     Economic Rents 
   Shareholders’   
    Discount Rates  
         (r
E - r
S) = Φ                  Ψ                
    FF3          CAPM    FF3   CAPM 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
       (1)     (2)      (3)     (4)   
 
1.  Oil Firms  -0.026*  -0.028*     0.955***   0.956*** 
   (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
 
 
2.  High Free Cash Flow  -0.035**  -0.040***    0.953***   0.954*** 
 &  (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
  Poor Investment Opportunities 
 
 
3.  High Averaged Free Cash Flow  -0.034**  -0.040***    0.953***    0.954*** 
  &   (0.015)  (0.015)   (0.004)  (0.004) 
  Poor Investment Opportunities 
 
 
4.  High Investment   -0.034***  -0.023*    0.953***   0.954*** 
 &  (0.013)  (0.013)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
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Table 3  
Curing Free Cash Flow Problems?   
 
GMM estimates of equation (8); discount factor defined in equation (9).  The parameters in 
columns 1 and 3 are estimated based on the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) estimate of the 
equity risk premium; columns 2 and 4 are based on the CAPM estimate of the equity risk 
premium.  All of the results in this table are based on the following “Jensen” sub-sample of 
firm/year observations constructed from the full sample:  the firm/year observations for which 
Free Cash Flow (FCF1) is in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year intersected with the 
firm/year observations for which investment opportunities (Q) are in the bottom 2/3 of their 
industry in a given year.  Based on this Jensen sub-sample, contrasting classes are defined 
in the rows as follows:  row 1, firm/year observations for which debt (DEBT) is greater than 
the median for their industry in a given year; row 2, firms  related to a Canadian group that 
brings together many distinct enterprises with their own publicly-traded shares; row 3, firms 
that either have one shareholder having 50% or more of the shares or that are effectively 
controlled by another firm.  Variables are defined in Table 1; see Section 4 and Appendix B 
for more extensive definitions.  χ is the parameter measuring the difference between (r
E - r
S) 
for one class of Jensen firms influenced by the control mechanism indicated by the row label 
and (r
E - r
S) for a contrasting class of Jensen firms without the control mechanism.  ψ is the 
parameter capturing deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition.  A 
value of ψ less than unity is consistent with decreasing returns to scale regardless of the 
competitive nature of output markets or increasing returns and a sufficient degree of 
imperfect competition to force the marginal return to capital below its average return.  In 
either case, it implies that the firms are earning positive economic rents.  The instruments 
are listed in footnote 8.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3  
Curing Free Cash Flow Problems? 
(Continued)   
 
 
Contrasting Classes             Estimated Parameters 
    Reduction In The  Measure Of 
   Gap  Between  Economic  Rents 
   Executives’  And 
   Shareholders’   
   Discount  Rates 
               Χ                            Ψ                 
     FF3          CAPM  FF3  CAPM 
                                                                                                                                                  
       (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)   
 
1.  High Debt                               -0.006  -0.005     0.963***   0.963*** 
   (0.022)  (0.020)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
 
 
2.  Group Membership   0.021   0.019    0.963***   0.962*** 
   (0.023)  (0.024)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
 
 
3. Concentrated Ownership   0.048**   0.039**    0.963***   0.963*** 
   (0.020)  (0.020)    (0.006)  (0.005) 
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Table 4  
Capital Structure And Financing Problems  
 
GMM estimates of equation (8); discount factor defined in equation (9).  The parameters in 
columns 1 and 3 are estimated based on the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) estimate of the 
equity risk premium; columns 2 and 4 are based on the CAPM estimate of the equity risk 
premium.  Contrasting classes are defined in the rows as follows:  row 1, the firm/year 
observations for which investment opportunities (Q) are in the top 2/3 of their industry in a 
given year intersected with the firms that do not have a bond rating; row 2, the same 
procedure as used in row 1 with the absence of a bond rating replaced by the firm/year 
observations for which debt (DEBT) is in the top 2/3 of their industry in a given year; row 3, 
the same procedure as used in row 1 with the absence of a bond rating replaced by the firms 
for which size (SIZE) is in the bottom 2/3 of the sample.  Variables are defined in Table 1; 
see Section 4 and Appendix B for more extensive definitions.  (r
O - r
I) = ρ is the difference 
between the discount rates on outside and inside funds for firms indicated by the row label.  
ψ is the parameter capturing deviations from constant returns to scale or perfect competition. 
  A value of ψ less than unity is consistent with decreasing returns to scale regardless of the 
competitive nature of output markets or increasing returns and a sufficient degree of 
imperfect competition to force the marginal return to capital below its average return.  In 
either case, it implies that the firms are earning positive economic rents.  The instruments 
are listed in footnote 8.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Capital Structure And Financing Problems  
(Continued)   
 
Contrasting Classes             Estimated Parameters 
 
 
    Difference Between  Measure Of 
    Discount Rates On  Economic Rents 
    Outside And Inside  
   Funds 
          ( r
O - r
I )  =  ρ                    Ψ               
          FF3          CAPM    FF3              CAPM  
                                                                                                                                                
       (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   
 
1.  No Bond Rating   0.090***   0.095***     0.954***   0.954*** 
 &  (0.017)  (0.016)    (0.004)  (0.004)
  
  Good Investment Opportunities  
 
 
2.  High Debt   0.076***    0.074***    0.956***   0.957*** 
 &  (0.016)  (0.016)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
  Good Investment Opportunities     
 
 
3.  Small Size   0.091***   0.089***    0.956***   0.957*** 
  &   (0.016)     (0.016)   (0.004)  (0.004) 
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